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2154 Rayburn House Office Building
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Honorable Chairman and Members:
Introduction
1. My thanks to the Subcommittee, the Chairman and Members for inviting me to offer
this testimony. My name is Kenneth Anderson. I am a professor of law at
Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, and a member of
the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, The Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, Stanford CA. My areas of specialty include the laws of war and
armed conflict, international law, and national security law. I have attached a brief
biography as an appendix to this statement.
2. I have been invited to testify regarding the use and future of unmanned battlefield
systems, and particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) commonly referred to as
“drones,” in current and future US armed conflicts and uses of force. I focus my
remarks on the legal policy implications of these systems, set in the framework of
technological and strategic evolution.
3. The basic conclusions of my testimony are six:
•

•

First, the United States government urgently needs publicly to declare the legal
rationale behind its use of drones, and defend that legal rationale in the
international community, which is increasingly convinced that parts, if not all, of
its use is a violation of international law.
Second, the legal rationale offered by the United States government needs to take
account, not only of the use of drones on traditional battlefields by the US
military, but also of the Obama administration’s signature use of drones by the
CIA in operations outside of traditionally conceived zones of armed conflict,
whether in Pakistan, or further afield, in Somalia or Yemen or beyond. This legal
rationale must be certain to protect, in plain and unmistakable language, the
lawfulness of the CIA’s participation in drone-related uses of force as it takes
1

•

•

place today, and to protect officials and personnel from moves, in the United
States or abroad, to treat them as engaged in unlawful activity. It must also be
broad enough to encompass the use of drones (under the statutory arrangements
long set forth in United States domestic law) by covert civilian agents of the CIA,
in operations in the future, involving future presidents, future conflicts, and future
reasons for using force that have no relationship to the current situation.
Third, the proper legal rationale for the use of force in drone operations in special,
sometimes covert, operations outside of traditional zones of armed conflict is the
customary international law doctrine of self-defense, rather than the narrower law
of armed conflict.
Fourth, Congress has vital roles to play here, mostly in asserting the legality of the
use of drones. These include: (i) Plain assertion of the legality of the programs as
currently used by the Obama administration, as a signal to courts in the US as
well as the international community and other interested actors, that the two
political branches are united on an issue of vital national security and foreign
policy. (ii) Congressional oversight mechanisms should also be strengthened in
ensuring Congress’s meaningful knowledge and ability to make its views known.
(iii) Congress also should consider legislation to clarify once and for all that that
covert use of force is lawful under US law and international law of self-defense,
and undertake legislation to make clear the legal protection of individual officers.
(iv) Congress should also strongly encourage the administration to put a public
position on the record. In my view, that public justification ought to be something
(self-defense, in my view) that will ensure the availability of targeted killing for
future administrations outside the context of conflict with Al Qaeda – and protect
against its legal erosion by acquiescing or agreeing to interpretations of
international law that would accept, even by implication, that targeted killing by
the civilian CIA using drones is per se an unlawful act of extrajudicial execution.

The Multiple Strategic Uses of Drones and Their Legal Rationales
4. Seen through the lens of legal policy, drones as a mechanism for using force are
evolving in several different strategic and technological directions, with different
legal implications for their regulation and lawful use. From my conversations and
research with various actors involved in drone warfare, the situation is a little bit like
the blind men and the elephant – each sees only the part, including the legal
regulation, that pertains to a particular kind of use, and assumes that it covers the
whole. The whole, however, is more complicated and heterogeneous. They range
from traditional tactical battlefield uses in overt war to covert strikes against non-state
terrorist actors hidden in failed states, ungoverned, or hostile states in the world
providing safe haven to terrorist groups. They include use by uniformed military in
ordinary battle but also use by the covert civilian service.
5. Although well-known, perhaps it bears re-stating the when this discussion refers to
drones and unmanned vehicle systems, the system is not “unmanned” in the sense that
human beings are not in the decision or control loop. Rather, “unmanned” here refers
solely to “remote-piloted,” in which the pilot and weapons controllers are not
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physically on board the aircraft. (“Autonomous” firing systems, in which machines
might make decisions about the firing of weapons, raise entirely separate issues not
covered by this discussion because they are not at issue in current debates over
UAVs.)
6. Drones on traditional battlefields. The least legally complicated or controversial use
of drones is on traditional battlefields, by the uniformed military, in ordinary and
traditional roles of air power and air support. From the standpoint of military officers
involved in such traditional operations in Afghanistan, for example, the use of drones
is functionally identical to the use of missile fired from a standoff fighter plane that is
many miles from the target and frequently over-the-horizon. Controllers of UAVs
often have a much better idea of targeting than a pilot with limited input in the
cockpit. From a legal standpoint, the use of a missile fired from a drone aircraft
versus one fired from some remote platform with a human pilot makes no difference
in battle as ordinarily understood. The legal rules for assessing the lawfulness of the
target and anticipated collateral damage are identical.
7. Drones used in Pakistan’s border region. Drones used as part of the on-going armed
conflict in Afghanistan, in which the fighting has spilled over – by Taliban and Al
Qaeda flight to safe havens, particularly – into neighboring areas of Pakistan likewise
raise relatively few questions about their use, on the assumption that the armed
conflict has spilled, as is often the case of armed conflict, across an international
boundary. There are no doubt important international and diplomatic questions raised
about the use of force across the border – and that is presumably one of the major
reasons why the US and Pakistan have both preferred the use of drones by the CIA
with a rather shredded fig leaf, as it were, of deniability, rather than US military
presence on the ground in Pakistan. The legal questions are important, but (unless
one takes the view that the use of force by the CIA is always and per se illegal under
international law, even when treated as part of the armed forces of a state in what is
unquestionably an armed conflict) there is nothing legally special about UAVs that
would distinguish them from other standoff weapons platforms.
8. Drones used in Pakistan outside of the border region. The use of drones to target Al
Qaeda and Taliban leadership outside of places in which it is factually plain that
hostilities are underway begins to invoke the current legal debates over drone
warfare. From a strategic standpoint, of course, the essence of much fighting against
a raiding enemy is to deny it safe haven; as safe havens in the border regions are
denied, then the enemy moves to deeper cover. The strategic rationale for targeting
these leaders (certainly in the view of the Obama administration) is overwhelming.
Within the United States, and even more without, arguments are underway as to
whether Pakistan beyond the border regions into which overt fighting has spilled can
justify reach to the law of armed conflict as a basis and justification for drone strikes.
9. Drones used against Al Qaeda affiliates outside of AfPak – Somalia, Yemen or
beyond. The President, in several major addresses, has stressed that the United States
will take the fight to the enemy, and pointedly included places that are outside of any
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traditionally conceived zone of hostilities in Iraq or AfPak – Somalia and Yemen
have each been specifically mentioned. And indeed, the US has undertaken uses of
force in those places, either by means of drones or else by human agents. The Obama
administration has made clear – entirely correctly, in my view – that it will deny safe
haven to terrorists. As the president said in an address at West Point in fall 2009, we
“cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is known, and whose
intentions are clear.” 1 In this, the President follows the long-standing, traditional
view of the US government endorsing, as then-State Department Legal Advisor
Abraham Sofaer put it in a speech in 1989, the “right of a State to strike terrorists
within the territory of another State where terrorists are using that territory as a
location from which to launch terrorist attacks and where the State involved has failed
to respond effectively to a demand that the attacks be stopped.” 2
10. The United States might assert in these cases that the armed conflict goes where the
combatants go, in the case particularly of an armed conflict (with non-state actors)
that is already acknowledged to be underway. In that case, those that it targets are, in
its view, combats that can lawfully be targeted, subject to the usual armed conflict
rules of collateral damage. One says this without knowing for certain whether this is,
in fact, the US view – although the Obama administration is under pressure for failing
to articulate a public legal view, this was equally the case for the preceding two
administrations. In any case, however, that view is sharply contested as a legal
matter. The three main contending legal views at this point are as follows:
•

•

1
2

One legal view (the traditional view and that presumably taken by the Obama
administration, except that we do not know for certain, given its reticence) is that
we are in an armed conflict. Wherever the enemy goes, we are entitled to follow
and attack him as a combatant. Geography and location – important for
diplomatic reasons and raising questions about the territorial integrity of states,
true – are irrelevant to the question of whether it is lawful to target under the laws
of war; the war goes where the combatant goes. We must do so consistent with
the laws of war and attention to collateral damage, and other legal and diplomatic
concerns would of course constrain us if, for example, the targets fled to London
or Istanbul. But the fundamental right to attack a combatant, other things being
equal, surely cannot be at issue.
A second legal view directly contradicts the first, and says that the legal rights of
armed conflict are limited to a particular theatre of hostilities, not to wherever
combatants might flee throughout the world. This creates a peculiar question as
to how, lawfully, hostilities against a non-state actor might ever get underway.
But the general legal policy response is that if there is no geographic constraint
consisting of a “theatre” of hostilities, then the very special legal regime of the
laws of armed conflict might suddenly, and without any warning, apply – and
overturn – ordinary laws of human rights that prohibit extrajudicial execution, and
certainly do not allow attacks subject merely to collateral damage rules, with

Pres. Obama West Point speech.
Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser, [].
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•

•

•

complete surprise and no order to it. Armed conflict is defined by its theatres of
hostilities, on this view, as a mechanism for limiting the scope of war and,
importantly, the reach of the laws of armed conflict insofar as the displace (with a
lower standard of protection) ordinary human rights law. Again, this leaves a
deep concern that this view, in effect, empowers the fleeing side, which can flee
to some place where, to some extent, it is protected against attack.
A third legal view (to which I subscribe) says that armed conflict under the laws
of war, both treaty law of the Geneva Conventions and customary law, indeed
accepts that non-international armed conflict is defined, and therefore limited by,
the presence of persistent, sustained, intense hostilities. In that sense, then, an
armed conflict to which the laws of war apply exists only in particular places
where those conditions are met. That is not the end of the legal story, however.
Armed conflict as defined under the Geneva Conventions (common articles 2 and
3) is not the only international law basis for governing the use of force. The
international law of self-defense is a broader basis for the use of force in,
paradoxically, more limited ways that do not rise to the sustained levels of
fighting that legally define hostilities.
Why is self-defense the appropriate legal doctrine for attacks taking place away
from active hostilities? From a strategic perspective, a large reason for ordering a
limited, pinprick, covert strike is in order to avoid, if possible, an escalation of the
fighting to the level of overt intensity that would invoke the laws of war – the
intent of the use of force is to avoid a wider war. Given that application of the
laws of war, in other words, requires a certain level of sustained and intense
hostilities, that is not always a good thing. It is often bad and precisely what
covert action seeks to avoid. The legal basis for such an attack is not armed
conflict as a formal legal matter – the fighting with a non-state actor does not rise
to the sustained levels required under the law’s threshold definition – but instead
the law of self-defense.
Is self-defense law simply a standardless license wantonly to kill? This
invocation of self-defense law should not be construed as meaning that it is
without limits or constraining standards. On the contrary, it is not standardless,
even though it does not take on all the detailed provisions of the laws of war
governing “overt” warfare, including the details of prison camp life and so on. It
must conform to the customary law standards of necessity and proportionality –
necessity in determining whom to target, and proportionality in considering
collateral damage. The standards in those cases should essentially conform to
military standards under the law of war, and in some cases the standards should
be still higher.

11. The United States government seems, to judge by its lack of public statements,
remarkably indifferent to the increasingly vehement and pronounced rejection of the
first view, in particular, that the US can simply follow combatants anywhere and
attack them. The issue is not simply collateral damage in places where no one had
any reason to think there was a war underway; prominent voices in the international
legal community question, at a minimum, the lawfulness of even attacking what they
5

regard as merely alleged terrorists. In the view of important voices in international
law, the practice outside of a traditional battlefield is a violation of international
human rights law guarantees against extrajudicial execution and, at bottom, is just
simple murder. On this view, the US has a human rights obligation to seek to arrest
and then charge under some law; it cannot simply launch missiles at those it says are
its terrorist enemies. It shows increasing impatience with US government silence on
this issue, and with the apparent – but quite undeclared – presumption that the armed
conflict goes wherever the combatants go.
12. Thus, for example, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial execution, NYU law
professor Philip Alston, has asked in increasingly strong terms that, at a minimum,
the US government explain its legal rationales for targeted killing using drones. The
American Civil Liberties Union in February 2010 filed an extensive FOIA request
(since re-filed as a lawsuit), seeking information on the legal rationales (but including
requests for many operational facts) for all parts of the drones programs, carefully
delineating military battlefield programs and CIA programs outside of the ordinary
theatres of hostilities. Others have gone much further than simply requests that the
US declare its legal views and have condemned them as extrajudicial execution – as
Amnesty International did with respect to one of the earliest uses of force by drones,
the 2002 Yemen attack on Al Qaeda members. The addition of US citizens to the
kill-or-capture list, under the authorization of the President, has raised the stakes still
further. The stakes, in this case, are highly unlikely to involve President Obama or
Vice-President Biden or senior Obama officials. They are far more likely to involve
lower level agency counsel, at the CIA or NSC, who create the target lists and make
determinations of lawful engagement in any particular circumstance. It is they who
would most likely be investigated, indicted, or prosecuted in a foreign court as, the
US should take careful note, has already happened to Israeli officials in connection
with operations against Hamas. The reticence of the US government on this matter is
frankly hard to justify, at this point; this is not a criticism per se of the Obama
administration, because the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations were
equally unforthcoming. But this is the Obama administration, and public silence on
the legal legitimacy of targeted killings especially in places and ways that are not
obviously by the military in obvious battlespaces is increasingly problematic.
13. Drones used in future circumstances by future presidents against new non-state
terrorists. A government official with whom I once spoke about drones as used by
the CIA to launch pinpoint attacks on targets in far-away places described them, in
strategic terms, as the “lightest of the light cavalry.” He noted that if terrorism,
understood strategically, is a “raiding strategy” launched largely against “logistical”
rather than “combat” targets – treating civilian and political will as a “logistical
target” in this strategic sense – then how should we see drone attacks conducted in
places like Somalia or Yemen or beyond? We should understand them, he said, as a
“counter-raiding” strategy, aimed not at logistical targets, but instead at combat
targets, the terrorists themselves. Although I do not regard this use of “combat” as a
legal term – because, as suggested above, the proper legal frame for these strikes is
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self-defense rather than “armed conflict” full-on – as a strategic description, this is
apt.
14. This blunt description suggests, however, that it is a profound mistake to think that
the importance of drones lies principally on the traditional battlefield, as a tactical
support weapon, or even in the “spillover” areas of hostilities. In those situations, it is
perhaps cheaper than the alternatives of manned systems, but is mostly a substitute
for accepted and existing military capabilities. Drone attacks become genuinely
special as a form of strategic, yet paradoxically discrete, air power outside of overt,
ordinary, traditional hostilities – the farthest project of discrete force by the lightest of
the light cavalry. As these capabilities develop in several different technological
direction – on the one hand, smaller vehicles, more contained and limited kinetic
weaponry, and improved sensors and, on the other hand, large-scale drone aircraft
capable of going after infrastructure targets as the Israelis have done with their Heron
UAVs – it is highly likely that they will become a weapon of choice for future
presidents, future administrations, in future conflicts and circumstances of selfdefense and vital national security of the United States. Not all the enemies of the
United States, including transnational terrorists and non-state actors, will be Al Qaeda
or the authors of 9/11. Future presidents will need these technologies and strategies –
and will need to know that they have sound, publicly and firmly asserted legal
defenses of their use, including both their use and their limits in law.
The Role of the CIA
15. The foregoing is intended to make clear that, first, “drone warfare” is really a set of
heterogeneous activities, technologies, strategies, and actors. What the military does
with drones in Afghanistan is different on many metrics from what the CIA does.
The legal rationales offered to sustain the policy therefore need to take account of
these differences as well.
16. The reality, however, is that the controversy centers on the use of drones that goes
further “outwards” on the axes of (i) geographical and tactical remoteness of their use
from a “traditional” armed conflict, (ii) the actor – uniformed military or civilian
agency, (iii) covert or overt, or, in today’s increasingly peculiar circumstances,
“clandestine” – not covert, but not publicly acknowledged, either, (iv) relation to an
existing overt war, or response to a new threat, thus raising the many controversies of
“preventive” uses of force.
17. As a practical matter today, this simply means that what we are here discussing,
ostensibly about “drones” and UAVs, is really, a millimeter below the surface, as
much or more a discussion of the appropriate and lawful role of the CIA. We should
be completely plain about this. Yes, there are issues related to the military use of
drones on the battlefield. But the fundamental argument is over the expansion of
drones beyond being a substitute weapon on traditional battlefields by the uniformed
military to be a strategic tool used far from AfPak, by civilian agents of the CIA, even
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perhaps – as Graham Allison and John Deutch urged in an op-ed last year – once
again genuinely covert.
18. If I might respectfully suggest to the Subcommittee, then, the most fundamental
question at issue here is not drones per se, but the technological development of
drones forcing a discussion on the proper role of the CIA.
19. The lawfulness under US domestic law of the CIA to use force, in accordance with
US statutes dating back to the founding of the CIA is not at issue. Use of force is not
mentioned as such, but there is no question as to its lawfulness under US domestic
law, provided that the steps required by the statute are taken. Congress has never
seen fit overtly to name the use of force as such in the statutory language, preferring
to use softer euphemisms and generalities. My view is that the time has come for
Congress explicitly to revise the CIA statute to declare the so-called “Fifth Function”
explicitly. I believe it is time to make that shift. Why?
20. Although unquestionably lawful under US domestic law, and viewed by the United
States as lawful under international law as a matter of international law of selfdefense, the international law position is beginning to come under pressure as parts of
the international law community come to see human rights law, the laws of armed
conflict, and other international law, as outlawing these kind of drone uses of force,
particularly done covertly by civilian agents of a government on the territory of
another. I emphasize that state practice and the views of states have long accepted the
legitimacy (even without pronouncing on the legality of such) of such interventions,
or at a minimum acquiesced in them, at least if they remain exceptional.
21. But that acquiescence by states as a matter of international law has largely concerned
the issue of the territorial integrity of states set against an intervention aimed, for
example, at attacking a terrorist in a safe haven. The practice today is contested
increasingly on grounds of human rights – it is a prohibited act of extrajudicial
execution, it is claimed, for the United States, for example, to launch its 2002 Yemen
missile strike; it should have attempted, at a minimum, to detain and capture, offer
surrender, before striking. And once having detained, it should then charge and try
suspects on criminal grounds. That goes to a claim of unlawful targeting; in addition,
of course, the concerns about unlawful collateral damage. The United States
government, its agencies, officials, and counsel, in my view, have very little idea of
the groundswell of an international campaign developing to de-legitimate the practice
of drone warfare, starting with its conduct by the CIA.
22. Beyond this, as the CIA’s central role in the Pakistan missions is on the front pages
many days, important voices in the international law community are going further to
attack not just the legal bases of drone warfare as such, but the fundamental premise
of “intelligence” uses of force by the CIA. The view of much of the international law
community is that all uses of force must be either law enforcement seeking to arrest a
person, or else uniformed military of a state, engaged in armed conflict under its legal
definitions in the laws of war. On that view, there is simply no legal space for the
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CIA to undertake uses of force as it is doing in Pakistan or anywhere else. Armed
conflict can only lawfully be undertaken by lawful combatants, and, on this view,
officials of the CIA are not lawful combatants. Consider the following statement of a
leading international law scholar at Notre Dame, Mary Ellen O’Connell:
“Members of the CIA are not lawful combatants and their
participation in killing persons – even in an armed conflict – is a
crime.”
23. This view was reinforced by a recent op-ed in the Washington Post by the eminent
Georgetown and former West Point scholar of the laws of war, Gary Solis. Consider
that Professor Solis said flatly that the CIA agents engaged in drone warfare are
America’s very own “unlawful combatants” – no less so, he said, than those they
target:
“In our current armed conflicts, there are two U.S. drone offensives.
One is conducted by our armed forces, the other by the CIA. Every
day, CIA agents and CIA contractors arm and pilot armed unmanned
drones over combat zones in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including
Pakistani tribal areas, to search out and kill Taliban and al-Qaeda
fighters. In terms of international armed conflict, those CIA agents
are, unlike their military counterparts but like the fighters they
target, unlawful combatants. No less than their insurgent targets,
they are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly participating
in hostilities, employing armed force contrary to the laws and
customs of war. Even if they are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots
are civilians violating the requirement of distinction, a core concept
of armed conflict, as they directly participate in hostilities.”
24. My view differs from that of either Professor O’Connell or Professor Solis. In my
view, the use of force by civilian CIA agents makes them combatants in the armed
conflict underway in AfPak, because they are taking direct part in hostilities under
traditional standards. In uses of force outside of AfPak, insofar as they are engaged
in lawful exercises of the customary sovereign right of self-defense against a nonstate actor, they are not combatants, but they are not thereby unlawful, nor is their use
of force unlawful under international law. I have stated the basis for that legal
conclusion in other places, and want to make a somewhat different observation here.
25. Professor Solis concludes by stating that the “prosecution of CIA personnel is
certainly not suggested.” I have trouble understanding why not, if one accepts the
legal view of unlawful combatancy by the CIA. He has stated a case of legal
equivalance between terrorist unlawful combatants and CIA unlawful combatants;
why prosecution does not follow is unclear. Indeed, Professor O’Connell – saying
aloud what others in the world of international law outside the United States, in my
experience, think about this matter but do not quite so bluntly say – CIA participation
in killing persons “is a crime.” Professor Solis concludes by wondering whether
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26. Drone warfare, therefore, raises questions on its own – but an underappreciated
question is one that drone warfare forces onto the table – whether the United States
government agrees, or does not agree, with its critics that the use of force by the CIA
is unlawful combatancy, and a crime under international law. And if it disagrees as it
presumably must, on what basis does it justify its lawfulness? Professor Solis
suggests that senior officials of the CIA have understood that question; the
inexplicable silence by the legal officials of the Obama administration as to how they
would defend the international lawfulness of these policies suggests, to the contrary,
that they do not. I would respectfully urge that Congress ought to insist on the
appearance by the relevant legal counsel to agencies in the administration to state for
the record why and on what basis these practices are lawful. Even as solely a
practical matter, the silence of the administration’s lawyers threatens to undermine
the legitimacy, as a practical, moral, legal, and political matter, of targeted killing by
the CIA using drones, in the future.
The Lack of Public Legal Justification from the Administration
27. The United States government is in a peculiar mismatch with respected to drone
targeted killing, particularly as done by the CIA outside of immediate hostilities. On
the one hand, senior leaders from the President and Vice-President on down,
positively gush over the program and its successes. In today’s newspapers –
Thursday, March 11, 2010 – CIA director Panetta was on the front pages in what was
clearly a carefully conceived effort to bolster the perception of the program in the
public mind, defending its many successes. He is right to do so. The program, in my
view, has been a stunning success. However, the CIA director’s touting of its success
is somewhat beside the point in current circumstances. The public, so far as I can tell,
does not doubt the success of the program – it does precisely what the President said
he would do, take the fight to the terrorists. The question is not its success – it is its
lawfulness. And its lawfulness not as a single thing focused around drones, but
instead the lawfulness of particular parts, conducted by particular actors.
28. As much as CIA director Panetta needs to put those successes to the public, he needs
another public discussion entirely – one in which he puts his general counsel on stage
to articulate why this form of killing people is not just effective, but legal. The utter
failure of the administration’s lawyers, anywhere across the administration, to do that
is breathtaking. This reticence extends beyond the general counsel of the agency
directly involved, the CIA; the principal US government lawyer on international law,
the State Department Legal Adviser, has likewise expressed no formal view as to the
correct legal view of targeted killing using drones by the CIA in a variety of settings.
The mismatch can perhaps be best imagined by thinking of President Obama and
Vice-President Biden and CIA director Panetta, standing in a press conference saying
the glowing things they have said about these programs and celebrating their success
– taking the fight to the enemy, denying them safe haven, going even into places like
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Yemen or Somalia if necessary. Imagine, however, that their senior lawyers are
standing beside them as they celebrate the ramping up of drone strikes month after
month, far in excess of the Bush years – turning to the lawyers, all they can say is,
“We have not yet reached a legal conclusion on this matter.” Would the President
and Vice-President have reason to believe they had been well-served by their
lawyers? Lawyers, we all know, cannot be mere yes-men, and these issues are
complicated and difficult – but we are more than a year into the Obama presidency,
and these programs have emerged as expanding centerpieces of its on-offense
counterterrorism policy, as well they should – and yet the lawyers publicly say
nothing.
29. It is no doubt unfair to say that the lawyers have not reached conclusions. In some
cases, that might be true, but most likely conclusions have been reached – but not
shared with the public. This seems to me a profound mistake, on legal grounds and
political grounds. There are ways to articulate the legal basis of these policies
without having to reveal operational matters, and the legitimacy of these programs
over the long term is distinctly at issue.
30. Congress could serve a useful function in pressing the administration to articulate
publicly its rationale. Moreover, if Congress believes – as certainly I believe it
should – that it ought to move legislatively to provide greater personal legal
protections, against legal action both domestic and abroad, for CIA and other national
security officers, then a crucial component of that is the public articulation of the
basis on which the United States government will tell the rest of the world that its
actions are lawful. That is not possible to do if all the relevant legal analysis is
hidden away in a confidential OLC opinion.
“Reducing US Disincentives to Use Violence”
31. Many other issues could be considered in this discussion. The levels of collateral
damage, for example – and whether they are high or low, to the extent they are
known, on the basis of the realistic alternatives to targeted killing. Critics of droneincurred collateral damage, after all, sometimes seem to imply that the alternative is
no use of force at all – whereas a more realistic comparison might be the effects of a
Pakistani army artillery barrage.
32. We could consider the evolution of technology and its likely effects on targeting
decisions, collateral damage, ability to identify a target and get close enough to kill
him and only him. I would urge Congress, in particular, to press forward research
and development of these technologies, in part with funding, but also with assurances
that those who develop these advances in far more discrete uses of force will not find
themselves also at legal risk, domestically or abroad, down the road. The best is very
firmly the enemy of the good – particularly when technology in these areas develops
incrementally, one small step at a time.
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33. I propose to close this written submission on a much more general note, however. It
has become something of a trope in these discussions that the very availability of
drones somehow makes it too easy for the US to kill, resort to violence and force.
For example, I spoke before a group of US law students at one of our finest law
schools some months ago, and was told by a student – in a group of students highly
unlikely, it seemed to me, to enlist in the armed forces or join the CIA – that the
problem with drones was that they “reduced the disincentives for the US to use force
below their efficient level.” I inquired as to how one would know the efficient level
of the United States use of force and what would serve to induce it, and was told that
the problem was that US personnel were not at personal risk – not enough US
servicemen and women were at personal risk – from getting killed on the battlefield
to deter the United States from needless violence. I was grateful, as I hope those
reading this testimony would be, that one young woman spoke up, visibly upset, and
said that it was hardly for privileged law students to sit and play God about efficient
incentives and disincentives to violence – and she hoped that the United States would
legally kill its enemies at least risk to its personnel.
34. I share that young woman’s sentiment, of course. Drones are a major step forward
toward much more discriminating uses of violence in war and self-defense – a step
forward in humanitarian weapons technology. That development needs strong
encouragement. But more fundamentally, I would hope that Congress would send
strong signals, not just that it regards this technology as a humanitarian step forward,
and not even the obvious message that the US intends to protect its serving men and
women while it undertakes lawful uses of force and sees no contradiction with its
legal duties in so doing.
35. The additional message that Congress should send is that targeted killing using drones
has evolved as fast and far as it has since 9/11 because the United States confronts an
enemy that has chosen to hide itself among civilians. What we call drone warfare is,
as much as anything else, an attempt to counter, through technology, tactics by our
enemies that rely upon systematic violations of the laws of war. The next time that
someone raises the proposition that American “disincentives to violence” are reduced
by drones, let them be reminded that, far more, drones represent an attempt to address
an unlawful equilibrium in which one side takes obligations under the laws of war
seriously, while the other side does not. That is the fundamental disequilibrium at
work here, and drones the most measured and discrete response available – consistent
with the policy that, as President Obama and all his administration have correctly
said, the United States must take the fight to its enemies.
36. I thank the Subcommittee for its kind invitation to appear and offer testimony, and
will endeavor to answer any questions you might have to the best of my ability.
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